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Introduction 
This article uses the global value chain (GVC) framework to analyze the globalizing 
processes that are taking place in the TV industry and argues that they have been driven by 
the dynamics of a newly formed TV content value chain. First, distinct segments emerged 
(content production, distribution and aggregation), and then the chain globalized as firms 
sought a competitive advantage by expanding internationally within their sector. This led 
to an increase in cross-border media flows, the transnationalization of production processes 
and the global coordination of the businesses involved in the chain. This article shows how 
the turning point which began in the late 1990s was characterized by the sudden and 
synchronous growth of transnational TV networks and formats (concepts of TV shows that 
are licensed for local adaptation).  
This article first introduces the GVC framework and analyzes the chain’s input-
output structure, examining each segment in turn. It also investigates its governance 
framework and studies the set of power relations among firms that populate the chain. 
Then, it establishes how the chain’s dynamics steered globalization processes in the 
industry and, documenting the growth of cross-border TV channels and formats, it argues 
that a global shift around the millenium marks the moment when the TV industry began 
coordinating on a global scale. Finally, it contends that conglomeration in television needs 
to be comprehended in the context of international production fragmentation within 
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expanding value chains and Internet disruption. 
Research for this article is based on GVC methodology, which is particularly useful 
to understand interactions between firms, connections across segments and shifting 
patterns of production (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011: 2). On the other hand, this 
article is limited to one particular chain in the TV industry, albeit an important one, and 
does not have the space to offer an in-depth study of each and every segment. As often in 
GVC studies, data come from a mixture of interviews and secondary material. Most of the 
fieldwork took place in London, where TV executives have been interviewed by the author 
since the early 2000s (this article takes a holistic perspective and cites only a tiny fraction 
of this material). None of these interviews were designed for a GVC analysis, and only 
during data analysis did the author progressively realise that value chains are a structural 
reality of the TV industry and the key to unlocking an understanding of its rapid 
globalization, hence this article.    
The use of three terms needs to be clarified. ‘International’ simply means that a firm 
operates (or TV channel broadcasts, etc.) in more than one country. ‘Transnational’ is used 
to suggest that a good, service or business adapts as it crosses borders and incorporates 
local and global elements: a TV format incorporates rules that are global in scope and 
alterations that are local in character; a transnational TV channel adapts (in terms of 
language, schedule or programming) to local audiences. ‘Global’ is used to denote scale, 
for example when referring to a conglomerate that operates in 100-plus territories.  It can 
also imply interdependence: a value chain is said to be global not merely because it is 
international but because it involves firms that interact with one another across borders and 
depend on one another to design, manufacture, transport and market a product.  
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Applying the global value chain framework 
The GVC approach originated in world-system theory and precisely in Hopkins’s and 
Wallerstein’s concept of ‘commodity chain’, which they developed in order to establish 
‘whether and to what extent a capitalist world-economy was an organizing force and a 
structural reality during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and the eighteenth centuries’ (Hopkins 
and Wallerstein, 1986: 159), in contradiction to many scholars who usually set the onset of 
globalization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (see Nederveen Pieterse, 2004: 14-
21). They called a commodity chain a ‘network of labor and production processes whose 
end result is a finished commodity’ (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1986: 159) and described 
these chains ‘as the warp and woof [or weft]’ of the world-economy’s system of 
production (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1994: 17). The relevance of their approach to the 
contemporary world economy was apparent and in the 1990s Gary Gereffi and colleagues 
initiated a body of literature labelled global commodity chains (GCC) analysis (Gereffi et 
al., 1994).  In the subsequent decade, the GCC approach morphed into GVC theory in 
order to reflect the interdisciplinary nature of research into chains and avoid to the 
connotation of the term ‘commodity’ with primary products such as crude oil (Bair, 2009; 
Gereffi et al., 1994; Lee, 2010; Sturgeon, 2009).  
The GVC perspective provides a unique tool to comprehend the structure of the global 
economy, which is characterized by a twin process of international fragmentation (also 
known as disintegration) of production and integration through trade (Feenstra, 1998: 31). 
Fragmentation is caused by the growing number of companies that outsource part or the 
entirety of the production process and that sell branded products they do not manufacture 
(Gereffi, 2001: 1620). In parallel, world markets have integrated through trade, which in 
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recent decades has grown dramatically both as a percentage of the world GDP and in 
absolute value: world merchandise exports have risen from US$ 59 billion in 1948 to US$ 
18,301 billion in 2013 (Feenstra, 1998: 31; WTO, 2014: 23). 
The process of fragmentation corresponds to ‘a breakdown in the vertically-integrated 
mode of production’ and a world-scale division of labour as multinationals spread their 
operations across the world allocating tasks and resources according to the competitive 
advantage they find (Feenstra, 1998: 31).  It is sometimes referred to as the ‘second 
unbundling’, following the first unbundling of production and consumption which 
accelerated with steam power in the 19th century (Baldwin, 2013: 13-26). International 
production processes have become characterized by inter-firm networks that span borders 
and form global chains, which Gereffi defines as ‘sets of interorganizational networks 
clustered around one commodity or product, linking households, enterprises, and states to 
one another within the world-economy’ (Gereffi et al., 1994: 2.).  Today, trade within 
value chains is worth US$ 7,723 billion, which represents more than half the total value of 
(non-fuel) global exports (WTO, 2013: 182-3). 
Value chains have four dimensions. In essence, a chain consists of ‘a sequence of 
value-adding economic activities’ that results in a finished commodity (Gereffi, 1994: 97). 
Segments, also called processes or ‘boxes’, vary from one chain to another but often 
include inputs (materials such as aluminium in the chain for passenger and transit rail 
vehicles or agrochemicals in the fruit and vegetables value chain), research and design, 
manufacturing, distribution, marketing, sales, consumption and recycling. The shape and 
nature of these sequential stages give a chain its anatomy or input-output structure. 
Territoriality is the spatial dispersion of the production processes, the governance structure 
relates to issues of control and power among economic agents and the institutional 
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framework refers to the impact that social context, institutions and regulatory systems have 
on value chains (Bair, 2009; Gereffi, 1994; Gereffi et al., 1994; Gereffi, 1995; Gereffi and 
Fernandez-Stark, 2013; Sturgeon, 2009). 
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that TV content production is increasingly 
being coordinated on a global scale by a newly emerged TV content value chain. Until the 
late 1980s, with the exception of the USA, broadcasters were fully integrated operations: 
apart from domestic films and imports from Hollywood, they produced much of what they 
aired. Cultural sovereignty was foremost in the minds of regulators and foreign 
broadcasters were not allowed to transmit on national territory. The law books of many 
nations also granted a monopoly to public broadcasters, who were tasked with entertaining 
the masses in an acceptable manner and making a contribution to national culture (e.g. 
Scannell, 1996). 
The disassembling of the old production model occurred when a combination of 
factors, including economic growth, rising industrial complexity, deregulation measures, 
trade liberalization and new technology, consumer demand and preferences, progressively 
led media firms to concentrate on those activities in which they retained a competitive 
advantage. This strategy created production segments that progressively formed a chain 
through which TV content began to travel from inception to consumption. This chain 
acquired international scope when broadcasters stepped up foreign outsourcing in search of 
the best programmes and formats, and when their own suppliers expanded across borders.  
As an industry, television can be seen as a series of inter-locking international 
production networks. The TV content value chain, on which this article focuses, lies at its 
core. Although its nature varies in accordance with the type of content (finished 
programming, formatted entertainment or sports), the key segments remain similar in all 
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cases. In addition, the manufacturing and marketing of TV sets, set-top boxes, remote 
controls and satellite dishes is coordinated by TV equipment global value chains based in 
the consumer electronics industry. For instance, the TV set industry is coordinated by a 
handful of players that have developed global production and distribution networks. The 
industry leader, Samsung, produces its own sets and sells some to other companies, while 
most Japanese manufacturers such as Hitachi, Matsushita or Sony, have closed down many 
of their factories and out-sourced most of the production to original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) such as Foxconn, a Sino-Taiwanese company. The geography of 
the chain has gone through major shifts in recent years, as these firms invest – or divest – 
in territories in function of the local advantage they find. Mexico, for instance, saw first a 
surge and then a decline in production in recent years as Japanese businesses that have not 
retreated from manufacturing altogether have relocated their operations to Asia (Carrillo et 
al., 2015; Kenney, 2004; Mortimore et al., 2000). Finally, companies in the 
communications global value chain deliver connectivity and specialize in the distribution 
and transmission of data and TV signals (see below).  
 
The TV content global value chain 
This chain is composed of three core segments: content production, distribution and 
aggregation (Figure 1). This section analyses each of these ‘boxes’ and the sub-segments 
that complete them.  
 
Content production 
TV production is a fast-growing sector that consists of the production of content that is 
licensed to content aggregators. Historically, independent TV content production sectors 
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developed first in the UK and USA. In the latter, it flourished until the Financial Interest 
and Syndication Rules were dismantled in the 1990s, weakening the rights position of 
producers vis-à-vis broadcasters and media conglomerates (the ‘fin-syn’ rules were 
introduced by the Federal Communications Commission two decades earlier in order to 
prevent US networks from owning the programmes they aired in prime time) (Kunz, 2007: 
77-8; Lotz, 2007:82-97). In the UK, the sector began to grow in 1982 when the 
government decided to set up Channel 4 as a ‘publisher-broadcaster’ that was required to 
commission its programming from independent producers (Darlow, 2004; Potter, 2008). 
Following further regulatory support, the sector was supplying 10,000 hours of TV 
programmes to the UK’s terrestrial channels, had an annual turnover of £722 million and 
employed 12,000 staff by the mid-1990s (Jones, 1995). The Communications Act 2003 
was the final piece of the regulatory puzzle: giving the independents full control over their 
rights, it led to the rise of larger production companies (known as the ‘super-indies’ in the 
UK) and to the sector’s unprecedented international growth (Chalaby, 2010).  
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Figure 1: The TV content global value chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author 
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media (for their online platform). 
Producers have their own suppliers. In the UK, the firms that service them are part of 
the ‘facilities sector’, which consists of 1,300 businesses employing in excess of 50,000 
people for a combined turnover of £2.2 billion (Pennington, 2011: 14). This sector is 
varied and comprises numerous specialist providers, such as: 
- TV studios, defined as ‘factory floor[s]’ that provide a range of facilities (including 
stages, production offices, workshops and dressing rooms) which enable a TV 
programme to be made as efficiently as possible (Kempton, circa 2014). In the 
UK, some studios are owned by broadcasters but many remain independent. 
Among the largest is Elstree Studios, comprising seven film and TV stages that 
range from 3,844 to 17,770 square feet. Like all TV studio complexes, Elstree 
hosts specialist suppliers that offer the back-up services integral to a shoot, such as 
prop-hire and kit-hire businesses (which also supply the crew that operate the 
rental equipment), special effects and prosthetics experts, and action vehicle 
suppliers. 
- Outside broadcast (OB) firms are also part of the communications value chain 
supplying the editing trucks and live transmission facilities that are required for the 
broadcast of sports events and special ceremonies. In the UK, the OB market is 
shared among four firms (Arena, CTV, NEP Visions and Telegenic) and the 
biggest contract on offer is the retransmission of English Premier League football 
(Pennington, 2014). 
- Post-production covers, notably, video and audio editing, the addition of visual and 
sound special effects, and the preparation of the completed work in the required 
formats ready for broadcast. While it still takes place once the shooting is 
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completed for scripted programming, it is increasingly integrated into production 
workflows across the reality TV genres. These latter shows have a very high 
shooting ratio (they shoot many more hours than they need for the final version) 
and storylines are shaped during the post-production process on the firms’ 
powerful non-linear editing systems. Fixed-rig productions using remote control 
cameras to unobtrusively film in sensitive areas such as secondary schools or A&E 
units also generate a vast quantity of material in need of editing (Sargent, interview 
2010; Strauss, 2014: 32). 
In London post-production houses cluster around Soho, with staff varying from 
fewer than 10 to around 300. Their combined turnover stood at £529 million in 
2012 (Dams, 2012; Pratt and Gornostaeva, 2009). The sector faces challenging 
conditions: post-production houses are under pressure to do less for more, not least 
because technological advances ensure that the barriers of entry to the industry 
remain low. Rapid technological changes have also meant that soft and hardware 
quickly becomes obsolete and workflows need to be constantly updated. However, 
the leading outfits such as The Farm, Envy or Molinare are growing well because 
they have state-of-the-art facilities and have large teams of creative staff whose 
skillset is constantly brought up to date. In the case of The Farm, the group can 
serve producers in LA and London. 
- Media asset management (MAM) and archive systems specialists provide solutions 
to digital workflows, multi-side media management (ensuring the connectivity of 
platforms during the collaborative process), scalable storage systems, data 
archiving and indexing, and data migration and protection. Because of the rapid 
evolution and complexity of the technology involved, such as, for instance, the 
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introduction of cloud-based computing, many of the firms in this sector are 
hardware agnostic and focus on designing bespoke MAM systems for their clients.  
- The supply chain of the production segment is constantly evolving as new 
techniques emerge and the complexity of putting together a TV show increases. 
The need for second-screen applications and video games, and the use of minicams 
(on board Formula One cars for instance), special rigs and unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) for filming, is providing a host of opportunities for niche 
providers that are often newcomers to the TV content value chain.  
 
Further down the content chain, the facilities sector has its own suppliers which 
include a wide range of software companies and equipment manufacturers.  Camera 
systems, monitors, projectors and other accessories are made by global firms like Cannon, 
Panasonic or Sony.  The largest manufacturer of professional motion picture equipment, 
however, is German: Arri was founded in Munich in 1917. Sennheiser, also from 
Germany, makes audio equipment such as microphones and headsets. Post-production 
houses rely on audio and video editing suites and software that have become vital to 
programme making, and the leaders in post-production editing and engineering technology 
are US-based Avid and Blackmagic Design, from Australia.  
The archive sector that provides footage of historic events, wildlife, sports, news and 
current affairs is among the suppliers offering services to both producers and broadcasters. 
These companies exploit large libraries of content that are currently being digitized to be 
made available online. There are also research companies that dispense market intelligence 
and ratings analytics; the prime example remains Nielsen, funded in 1923 and listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange. It provides the national measurement service in the USA and 
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Canada and analyses viewing habits across 100 territories. Some younger companies 
specialize in mining the various data sets generated by the social media universe 
surrounding TV shows of today. There are also trade press publishers, trade fair organizers 
(e.g. Reed Midem, which owns the MipCom and MipTV annual events in Cannes) and 
business affairs and commercial consultancies that help media firms sell or buy assets or 
raise finance. 
 
Distribution 
The role of the second segment, distribution, is to coordinate content production and 
content aggregation. Independent distribution developed early on in the territories where 
commercial television prevailed. In the USA for instance, Fremantle Corporation -  the 
company that pioneered franchising in its home market and the sale of US TV series 
abroad – was established by Paul Talbot in 1952 (Guider, 2005). All American Television 
and King World, two syndication companies, provide other examples. In Europe today, the 
British distribution sector posted revenues of £1.16 billion for 2013, and the segment is 
increasingly dominated by integrated companies such as BBC Worldwide, 
FremantleMedia International and ITV Studios Global Entertainment (Table 4) (Fry, 2014: 
4-5).  
A distributor’s core remit is to wring every last drop from the IP they represent, 
whether it belongs to their parent company or a third party. In the latter case, they need to 
obtain the distribution rights, which often necessitates the development of a long-term 
relationship between the two parties. With the multiplication of genres, rights, windows 
and platforms, distribution is an increasingly complex activity requiring support in finance, 
marketing, and commercial law. For instance, content acquisition may require programme 
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funding – a practice known as deficit funding - as broadcasters’ budgets may not cover all 
production costs, which is usually the case with drama. In such a situation, the distributor 
owns some of the IP but shares the commercial risk.  
The rights attached to a TV show have become extensive. On television, they include 
interactive, adaption and video-on-demand rights; beyond the TV screen, they embrace all 
sorts of new media and online platforms and extend to the ancillary rights that are 
necessary for licensing & merchandising deals. The sale of these rights needs to be 
coordinated among different buyers and territories. For instance, if a drama has been sold 
as a ready-made tape and then adapted at a later stage, the distributor must be mindful of 
where each version can be seen and needs to put in place a carefully choreographed 
sequence of holdbacks and releases (Jackson, interview 2012; Nohr, interview 2013). 
 
Content aggregation 
The third segment is content aggregation, which consists in bringing content together 
under the umbrella of a single brand and marketing it to audiences and/or advertisers. 
Digitization has multiplied the delivery modes and business models broadly fall into four 
categories (Table 1). 
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Table 1: Content aggregation business models 
Linear/free-to-air 
 
 
commercial free-to-air channels; 
public service broadcasters; basic 
cable & satellite channels 
On-demand (non-linear) /free-
to-view 
 
Catch-up TV; video-sharing 
websites and multi-channel 
networks 
Linear/pay-to-view 
 
 
Pay-TV platforms and channels; 
pay-per-view TV programming 
On-demand  (non-linear)/pay-
to-view 
 
Transactional and subscription-
based video-on-demand services 
(TVoD and SVoD) 
Source: author’s compilation 
 
Linear and free-to-air operators include broadcasters that are funded either by licence fees 
or taxpayers (public service broadcasters), or commercial TV channels that air freely but 
recoup their investment through advertising and sponsoring. Free-to-view on-demand 
(non-linear) content consists of all digital content supported by advertising and/or licence 
fees. Public and commercial broadcasters’ catch-up websites fall into this category, as do 
video-sharing platforms such as YouTube and social networks with video uploading 
facilities (e.g. Facebook). The content of these websites is increasingly provided by 
professional content creators and organized in channels by multi-channel network (MCN) 
operators. For instance, Maker Studios, a YouTube channel operator owned by Disney, 
claims 380 million subscribers worldwide across a portfolio of 55,000 channels (Webdale, 
2014). Subscriptions require only an email address and the business model of these MCN 
operators remains advertising-driven.  
Linear and pay-to-view content includes pay-TV services that are subscription-based. 
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It is a business model that leading exponents DirecTV (across the Americas) and Sky (in 
Europe) have helped establish. Pay-TV platforms charge subscribers for basic and 
premium cable and satellite channels that they blend with their own-brand networks; 
premium packages being driven by movies and live sports.  Despite the arrival of new 
platforms and signs of ‘cord-cutting’ in mature markets (i.e consumers cancelling their 
cable or satellite TV subscription), the pay-TV market remains healthy. In 2014, it was 
worth US$ 269 billion and served 920 million subscribers worldwide, and is predicted to 
grow to 1.1 billion subscribers generating US$ 323 billion by 2018 (Clancy, 2014). 
Occasionally, these services offer pay-per-view (PPV) content for specific events (e.g. 
boxing matches on HBO).  This content is broadcast at a specific time and makes PPV 
distinct from on-demand services. 
The fastest growing business model is on-demand pay-to-view that encompasses all 
types of digital content delivery services that charge for access. Several distinctions exist in 
this market segment. First, there is a difference between transactional video-on-demand 
(TVoD) services that charge for each request (or transaction, hence the name) and 
subscription video-on-demand (SVoD) where customers pay a fixed sum of money, 
usually monthly, for a set amount of content. Technically, content can be streamed over the 
Internet, as most OTT (over-the-top) content providers do (e.g. Netflix), or it can be 
downloaded by customers to rent or own (Apple’s iTunes and some broadcasters’ on-
demand websites). The SVoD market is dominated by two types of players: OTT providers 
that are ‘pure’ Internet companies and the on-demand services of pay-TV platforms (EAO, 
2014: 137).  
The European Audiovisual Observatory database (EAO henceforth) listed 3,037 on-
demand services established in the region by March 2015 (EAO, 2015). OTT SVoD 
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provider Netflix has turned out to be the star company, accumulating 53 million 
subscribers across its territories by the same year (Webdale, 2015). 
Content aggregators have suppliers in addition to producers. TV channels rely on 
infrastructure and media services companies in the communications value chain in order to 
broadcast their signals and reach viewers across a variety of devices. In the UK, most 
broadcasters, including the BBC, rely on Arqiva’s communications infrastructure to keep 
connected to their customers. Pay-TV platforms, and many of the channels that are on 
them (CNN, Discovery, MTV, etc.) need satellite operators. In Europe, they use the 
services of either Luxembourg-based Société Européenne des Satellites (SES) or Eutelsat 
in Paris. SES broke Eutelsat’s monopoly to launch its first communications satellite in 
1988 and, co-locating craft in the same orbital positions, proceeded to build up video 
neighbourhoods capable of distributing hundreds of video channels over large swathes of 
Europe (Chalaby, 2009: 57-82). Today, SES is the world leader and operates a fleet of 54 
geostationary satellites complemented by a large network of teleports (telecommunications 
centres that link satellites to ground-based communications) to broadcast more than 6,400 
TV channels to almost 300 million homes worldwide (SES, 2014).  
Satellite operators have their own supply chain as they need to procure spacecraft 
from one of eight manufacturers in the world, have them insured and get them launched. 
SpaceCo, an Allianz subsidiary, provide multiple covers against the perils of space travel, 
including pre-launch, launch pad property damage and in-orbit insurance. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, there are few providers able to launch satellites into space, Europe’s 
Arianespace and United Launch Alliance, a Boeing-Lockheed Martin joint venture, are 
being the most preeminent. Elon Musk’s SpaceX, a company founded in 2002, has started 
to make the launch industry more competitive: its Falcon 9 has proven its capability to 
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launch satellites into geostationary orbit at a fraction of the price of its older rivals (Dillow, 
2015). 
Entertainment platforms rely on content delivery networks (CDNs), which work as 
follows: 
 
A CDN is a system of distributed servers located in strategic positions around the 
globe that delivers web content to users based on their geographic location. Copies of 
the content exist on each server and by dynamically calculating which server is 
located closest to the person requesting that content, the CDN eliminates the distance 
that the content has to travel and reduces the number of ‘hops’ that a packet of data 
must make. This optimizes the user’s receipt of that content and their viewing 
experience, even when bandwidth is limited or there are sudden spikes in demand 
(Strauss, 2015: 34). 
 
In order to guarantee streaming quality, the leading international platforms, including 
Netflix, Amazon’s LoveFilm and Google’s YouTube, have built their own expansive 
network (Silver, 2015: 101), but other platforms rely on a third type of communications 
infrastructure specialists: CDN providers. World-leading Akamai, which carries up to 30 
per cent of daily web traffic, has 160,000 servers in 95 countries (Strauss, 2015: 34). OTT 
platforms connect their CDNs with local Internet service providers (such as Comcast in the 
USA, Deutsche Telekom in Germany or Virgin Media in the UK) in order to pass through 
the last mile and reach customers (Silver, 2015: 101). 
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Power relations in the TV content value chain  
The examination of the governance structure sheds light on the distribution of power 
within the TV content chain. Control and rewards are not equally distributed in inter-firm 
networks and some companies have come to play a leading role. Although the current 
GVC literature identifies up to five governance structures (Gereffi et al., 2005), the initial 
dichotomy between buyer-driven and producer-driven chains remains valid and suits our 
purpose:  
 
In “producer-driven” chains, power is held by final-product manufacturers and is 
characteristic of capital-, technology- or skill-intensive industries. In “buyer-driven” 
chains, retailers and marketers of final products exert the most power through their 
ability to shape mass consumption via dominant market shares and strong brand 
names. They source their products from a global network of suppliers in cost-
effective locations to make their goods (Gereffi, 2014: 13). 
 
The TV set value chain is an instance of a producer-driven network. The lead firms 
are companies that gain competitive advantage through research and innovation which they 
are able to leverage on a global scale. They benefit from high-entry barriers to an industry 
where considerable expertise and investment is needed to compete in such a concentrated 
sector. The TV set market, which exceeds US$ 105 billion (for 230 million units shipped 
worldwide annually) is dominated by three global electronics brands: Samsung, Sony and 
Panasonic (Campbell, 2014). 
By contrast, the TV content value chain is driven by its retailers: content aggregators. 
There are a few instances where content producers are in the driving seat because they 
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have developed a show that is particularly successful and desirable to broadcasters. Some 
TV programmes are also complex to produce which gives a certain amount of ‘competence 
power’ to TV producers (Sturgeon, 2009: 129). Research, however, shows that ultimately 
the balance of power lies in favour of the broadcasters (Chalaby, 2015: 76-80).  They are in 
control of the chain because they are much bigger than independent content suppliers, have 
large commissioning budgets and are far fewer in number than producers. Production 
remains in a fragmented sector characterized by low barriers to entry – unlike content 
aggregation - and thus operates in a market that is ferociously competitive. In the UK for 
instance, whilst ITV’s revenues reached £2.6 billion in 2014, the turnover of the country’s 
largest independent producer, IMG, stood at £173 million, dropping to £53 million for the 
tenth largest, Wall to Wall (Broadcast Indie Survey, 27 March 2015: 7; ITV, 2015: 107). 
Terrestrial broadcasters in the UK deal with a large number of content suppliers: the BBC 
commissioned programmes from 276 producers, Channel 4 from 338, and Discovery from 
78 (Broadcast Indie Survey, 27 March 2015: 26, 31; Channel 4, 2015: 13).  
In the UK, broadcasters behaved in a similar way to that of supermarkets whose size 
alone gave them control over large transnational food chains and thousands of farmers. 
Bullying and strong-arm tactics were so rife in the TV content chain that producers asked 
the Government to intervene. After intense lobbying, the Communications Act 2003 duly 
established a code of practice that safeguards terms of trade between broadcasters and their 
suppliers (Chalaby, 2010).  
 
Internationalizing the TV content chain: The 1990s global shift 
The GVC approach and its focus on firms’ activities give us a better understanding of how 
exactly the globalization process unfolded.  Initially, the formation of segments in the TV 
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industry changed the way firms sought to gain a competitive advantage. As a business 
grows, it acquires know-how and capital that can be sector-specific (Porter, 2004: 257). 
For instance, a company that builds a set of relationships with others not only makes chain 
coordination smoother but acquires an amount of relational capital (Capello and Faggian, 
2005). As its skills and resources give it a competitive edge in a particular segment, it 
makes sense for it to grow internationally within this area. 
Content aggregators operate in the retail market. They need the marketing skills to 
grow their subscriber base or aggregate eyeballs for advertisers. In the Internet age, they 
need to be available on multiple platforms, and for those broadcasters without 
recommendation algorithms, they must gather and interpret increasingly complex sets of 
audience data. Ultimately, all have to grow into entertainment destinations that satisfy a 
demand and build public-facing brands that are recognized by advertisers and audiences 
alike. In an ever more competitive environment, it is a demanding task that requires large 
sums of investment and a distinct skillset.   
The expertise of TV producers allows them to devise programmes that are increasingly 
complex to produce: light entertainment shows need to come with second-screen 
applications, talent competitions require well-honed producing and editing skills, and the 
best travelled formats are always based on subtle but precise format points and rules. 
Producers also need to have accumulated relational capital: without past successes the 
doors of major broadcasters can remain stubbornly shut.  They must be in constant touch 
with TV buyers and adept at pushing their formats onto the global stage: selling IP in a 
crowded content global market requires increasingly sophisticated PR and marketing 
campaigns. Thus, the search for competitive advantage had led firms to seek growth 
internationally within their segments, and played an important factor in the global 
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expansion of content aggregators and producers in recent times.  
 
Transnational TV channels and platforms 
TV channels began to cross European borders when the first communications satellites 
were launched in the early 1980s. In the first two decades or so, most of them struggled to 
break even and many closed down: their reception universe was too small, international 
transmission remained expensive, the international copyright regime was ill-equipped to 
deal with international broadcasting, regulators were unsympathetic and advertisers 
uninterested. The planets aligned in the late 1990s when barriers and obstacles began to 
recede: new technologies broke through (most notably, digitization facilitated the 
formation of large-capacity international communications networks), a viable international 
copyright regime was created (not least through the ‘SatCab’ EU Directive adopted in 
2003), regulation evolved (e.g. the Television Without Frontiers EU Directive voted in 
Paris in 1989), the number of cross-border subscribers expanded and advertisers paid 
attention. This led to a rapid growth of transnational TV channels across a wide variety of 
genres, including news and business news (Bloomberg, CNBC, Euronews, etc.), factual 
entertainment (e.g. the Discovery and National Geographic suite of channels), 
entertainment (AXN, HBO and Fox-branded channels), children’s television (such as 
Cartoon Network, the Disney brands and Nickelodeon), sports (Eurosport, ESPN), music 
television (MTV, Viva, etc.) and films (e.g. Studio Universal, Turner Classic Movies) 
(Chalaby, 2009).  
As international broadcasters expanded across frontiers they learned to deal with a 
multinational universe and adapt their channels to local taste. They progressively broke up 
the pan-European satellite feeds they had launched initially and turned them into 
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transnational networks of local channels. Providing a prime example of ‘the globalization 
of the business model of television and the efforts of international and domestic companies 
to deal with the resilience of national cultures’ (Waisbord, 2004: 360), these channels share 
a concept, a brand, resources and infrastructures, and much of the programming, but adapt 
to their cultural and commercial environment. The degree of localization varies from genre 
to genre, from minimal in factual entertainment to the incorporation of local programming 
in children’s television.  
Today, media owners apply this principle across a portfolio of brands, which they 
deploy territory by territory. For instance, Discovery launched its first pan-European 
satellite feed in 1989. A quarter-century later, it operates 24 brands (Animal Planet, 
Discovery Channel, DMAX, Quest, etc.) reaching 436 million cumulative subscribers 
across 22 European territories. As these brands are localized in most countries in which 
they operate, they represent in excess of 200 channels in total (Animal Planet has 34,TLC 
has 21, and so on) (Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Leading transnational TV networks in Europe, 2013 
 
Number of brands/Key brands No.  of 
channels  
No. of 
territories 
No. of cumulative 
subscribers (in 
millions) 
Revenue 
(US$ 
million) 
Discovery 
Networks 
25/ Aninal Planet, Discovery Channel 
(extensions include Discovery 
History, Discovery Home & Health, 
Discovery Real Time, Discovery 
Science, Discovery World, etc), 
DMAX, Eurosport, Quest, TLC 
200 50+ 436  620 (plus 
651 for 
Eurosport) 
 
Viacom 
International 
Media 
Networks 
14/BET, Comedy Central, Game One, 
MTV, Nick Jr., Nickelodeon, 
Nicktoons, Paramount Comedy, 
Paramount Channel,  TMF, VH1, 
VIVA 
210 50+ 387 749 
Disney Media 
Networks  
5/Disney Channel, Disney Cinemagic, 
Disney Junior, Disney XD 
98 23 100+ 491 
Fox 
International 
Channels 
16/FOX (extensions include FOX 
Life, FOX Crime, FOX Movies, FOX 
Sports, etc.), Star Movies, National 
94 50+ 178  420 
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Geographic Channel 
Turner 
Broadcasting 
System (A 
Time Warner 
company) 
11/Boing, Boomerang, Cartoon 
Network, Showtime, Silver, Star!, 
TVM, TNT 
40 20+ 100 396 
Universal 
Networks 
International 
8/13th Street, Diva Universal, E! 
Entertainment, Golf Channel, Style 
Network, Syfy, Universal Channel 
63 17 50+ 330 
Chellomedia 48/Bio., Canal Panda, CBS Action, 
CBS Drama, CBS Europa, CBS 
Reality, Cosmopolitan TV, Extreme 
Sports Channel, MGM, Reality TV 
 50+  254 
BBC 
Worldwide 
3/BBC Entertainment, BBC Lifestyle, 
BBC Knowledge, 
123 10 173 (worldwide 
figure) 
170 
Sony Pictures 
Television 
Networks 
3/Animax, AXN (extensions include 
AXN Crime, AXN Mystery, AXN 
Sci-Fi, etc.), Sony Entertainment 
Television 
66 50+  138 
A&E 
Television 
Networks 
3/H2, History, Lifetime 68 23 38  111 
Sources: company sources; Digital TV research, 2013; EAO, 2015, M&M Global, 2013.  
Notes: All Mobile, +1 and duplicating HD channels excluded. Brand extensions only counted as 
distinct brands when justified with positioning and programming. Territories coincide with national 
boundaries insofar as one language is spoken in that country. When distinct linguistic markets exist, as 
in Belgium or Switzerland, the practice is to count them as separate territories.  
 
 
As a result, transnational TV networks count among TV’s most prestigious brands and 
can be found on every cable and satellite platform across Europe. Taken together, the ten 
leading international channel operators earned US$ 4.3 billion in advertising and carriage 
fees income in Europe alone in 2013, and are predicted to generate US$ 5.5 billion by 2018 
(Digital TV Research, 2013: 1-2). All these players continue to aggressively expand their 
networks, and the sector even welcomes newcomers: Scripps Networks Interactive, for 
instance, now operates two brands (Food Network and Travel Channel) and 50 channels 
across 21 European territories. 
There are many entertainment platforms in Europe that operate in a single country 
(EAO, 2014: 19), but many are internationalizing fast as they are supported by an Internet 
infrastructure that is global in scope. Platforms have three options to cross borders: 
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- Video-sharing sites are accessible worldwide since they own the world rights of the 
content they offer, much of it being user-generated (EAO, 2014: 15).  
- Services with more exclusive content such as MCNs tend to be universally 
available but use geo-blocking in order to prevent users, based on their location, 
from accessing certain content. This practice enables them to offer specific content 
in targeted territories and/or block content for which they do not own the 
worldwide rights (EAO, 2014: 15).  
- TVoD and SVoD platforms with high-end programming such as drama have to 
clear the rights before being able to roll in a new territory. Netflix’s strategy is to 
increase the number of commissions, which enables the SVoD provider to 
augment the hours of original programming and acquire the global rights at the 
onset, facilitating its plans to be in 200 territories by 2017 (Webdale, 2015; White, 
2015).  
 
The advent of TV formats and TV content production majors 
TV content production companies have taken the same international path, taking advantage 
of the phenomenal growth of the TV format business to expand across borders. From 
modest origins, TV format trading was worth in excess of €3.0 billion per year by the late 
2000s. Formats have become part of the daily diet of broadcasters’ schedules: In Europe 
for instance, a sample of 84 channels aired an average of 338 hours of formats in 2013 
(FRAPA, 2009: 8-13; TBI Formats, 2014: 23). The majority of top-rating programmes, 
notably the ubiquitous talent competitions, are formatted. The trade is no longer limited to 
game shows and reality TV; fiction has caught up, as dramas and comedies have all joined 
the format revolution and are being re-made across borders (Chalaby, 2015).  
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The historical evolution of the format trade echoes the development of cross-border 
channels. The first TV format deals were signed in the early 1950s and the trade plodded 
along until the end of the century. Formatting remained a marginal activity: a small 
proportion of shows were adapted, no more than a handful of businesses were involved in 
the trade, and most formats were game shows that travelled from the USA to a few 
developed TV markets (Chalaby, 2012a; Moran, 2013). 
It began to change in the late 1990s when a combination of factors made the trade 
explode. In mature markets television was becoming more competitive, and broadcasters 
welcomed with open arms formulas that had been tested elsewhere that enabled them to 
de-risk their schedules. It was also the time when the TV industry developed in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the Middle East, across Asia and Latin America. Fledgling broadcasters 
quickly realized that their audiences preferred local shows to imported ones, but local 
programming is a big step up requiring know-how and resources: they would need to rely 
on concepts that came with a pre-established method of production and guidelines.  
Furthermore, new TV genres emerged that provided a rich source of TV formats. All 
reality and factual entertainment shows come with a clear structure and narrative blocks 
that are easily identified, described and reproduced. Finally, four shows (Who Wants to be 
a Millionaire?, Survivor, Big Brother and Idols), later known as the four super-formats, 
swept audiences off their feet and announced TV formats to the world. It is these factors 
that turned a cottage industry into a multi-billion dollar business, multiplying the number 
of formats, the number of countries they travelled to and the number of companies that 
distributed and produced them (Chalaby, 2011, 2015; Moran, 1998). TV formats not only 
contributed to the expansion of cross-border flows but facilitated the internationalization of 
production companies. 
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Formats hold a great advantage for production companies as they enable them to reach 
scale with a minimum investment. When adaptation rights are sold, the format rights 
holder receives a licence fee. Production companies, however, have realised that there is 
more money to be made if they hold on to those rights and produce the format themselves.  
Although many format licences are still exchanged producers try to adapt their own shows 
in as many markets as possible, a strategy that has led to their international expansion 
(Chalaby, 2012b). As a result, there are now eleven global TV content production majors 
with a footprint that varies between 3 and 30 territories (Table 3). 
Thus, the late 1990s marks the moment the TV industry took a global turn.  The 
sudden and synchronous growth of cross-border TV channels and formats after years of 
slow development must be interpreted as the point of internationalization of segments that 
had formed around distinct value-adding moments and the formation of a chain 
coordinated on a global scale. 
 
Table 3: The world’s eleven TV content production majors, 2015 
Company Owner/type of 
company 
Headquarters Number of production 
companies/key brands 
International 
footprint (number 
of territories) 
All3Media Integrated/ 
Discovery-Liberty 
Global 
London 20/idtv, Lion television, 
MME Moviement, 
Studio Lambert, Zoo 
Production 
6 
Banijay/Zodiak Independent London/Paris 58/Air Productions, 
Bunim/Murray, 
Brainpool, Magnolia, 
Marathon, Nordisk, 
RDF, Zodiak TV 
12 
BBC Worldwide Integrated/BBC London / 7 
Endemol Shine 
Group 
Independent/Apollo 
Global management & 
21st Century Fox 
London 109/19 Entertainment, 
Endemol Shine UK’s 
group of companies, 
Sharp Entertainment, 
Shine Nordics 
30  
FremantleMedia Integrated/RTL London 25/Fremantle, Grundy, 
UFA 
22 
ITV Studios Integrated/ITV London 18/12 Yard, Gurney 9 
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Productions, Silverback, 
Talpa Media, 
Thinkfactory Media 
 
Nice 
Entertainment 
Group 
Integrated/Modern 
Times Group 
Stockholm 28/DRG, Novemberfilm, 
Strix,  
16 
NBC Universal 
Intl. TV 
Production 
Integrated/NBC 
Universal 
London 5/Carnival Films; 
Monkey Kingdom 
3 (Australia, UK, 
USA) 
Red Arrow 
Entertainment 
Integrated/ 
ProSiebenSat.1 
Munich 13/CPL Productions, 
Endor Productions, 
Kinetic, Mob Film 
7 
Sony Television 
Production Intl. 
Integrated/Sony 
Pictures Television 
London 18/2waytraffic, Silver 
River Productions 
13 
Warner Bros. Intl. 
TV Distribution 
Integrated/Time 
Warner 
London 3/Eyeworks, Shed 
Media; BlazHoffski 
17 
Source: adapted from Chalaby, 2015: 18. 
 
Conglomeration and international fragmentation of production 
Conglomeration is often the by-product of either horizontal consolidation (the merger of 
two firms operating in the same market) or vertical integration (a firm buying up or down 
the value chain). Between 1990 and 2014, the average yearly total value of merger and 
acquisition (M&A) deals has exceeded US$300 billion (Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions 
and Alliances, 2015). Following a slowdown during the recent recession, deals have shown 
a sharp rebound to climb to US$308.5 billion in 2014 (Thomson Reuters, 2015: 1). 
Sectoral M&A activity is in decline for 2015, although thirteen deals worth more than 
US$1 billion (worth a total of US$115 billion) were announced in the first six months of 
the year in the USA alone, the largest acquisition being that of Time Warner Cable by 
Charter Communications for US$ 55.6 billion (PWC, 2015). 
Even though it is a trend that is a matter of concern for political economists (e.g. 
Downing, 2011; Flew, 2012; Mosco, 2009: 158-69), it must be born in mind that while 
some fusions succeed, others fail (e.g. Vivendi and Universal, AOL and Time Warner). 
Above all, conglomeration in the media and entertainment industry is taking place in a 
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context of international fragmentation of production within expanding value chains. 
Fragmentation can drive consolidation within segments as well as between segments, but 
can equally lead firms to concentrate on one ‘box’ and cease activities that straddle several 
processes. As seen above, the Japanese companies that own TV set brands contract much 
of the manufacturing to OEMs to focus on design and marketing. Similarly, Time Warner 
may be reinforcing its position in the TV production segment (Eyeworks being only its 
most recent acquisition in the sector), but is clearly less interested in aggregation (having 
spun out Time Warner Cable in 2009).  
The formation of the TV content value chain has given an opportunity to many new 
businesses to flourish and remain independent. Nonetheless, it is an industry clearly 
marked both by intra-segment conglomeration driven by consolidation, and inter-segment 
conglomeration pushed by vertical integration. None of the world’s largest TV content 
production groups listed in Table 3 is older than two decades (the oldest, Endemol, was 
created in 1994) and most have formed in recent years in frantic rounds of mergers and 
acquisitions. Discounting BBC Worldwide, each brings together an average of 30 
production companies. These have also started to merge with one another: Shine, Endemol 
and the Core Media Group joined forces in 2014, forming a group of 109 companies, 
followed by Banijay and Zodiak the following year. 
Vertical integration is also prevalent and has been driven by media and entertainment 
groups, which have made 30 acquisitions in the segment in the past three years (Chalaby, 
2015: 115-16). Many of the target firms were multi-national companies in their own right, 
including All3Media (for which Discovery and Liberty Global disbursed US$ 930 million), 
Eyeworks (acquired by Time Warner), Nice Entertainment (Modern Times Group) or 
Twofour (ITV). ITV has made twelve acquisitions, spending US$ 532 million on The 
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Voice’s Talpa Media alone. Table 3 shows that only two TV content production majors 
remain independent, one of them being half owned by 21st Century Fox.  
 
 
The distribution segment has also seen a fair amount of corporate activity and most 
international distributors are in the hands of TV content production majors today (Table 4).  
 
Table 4: World’s leading integrated distribution divisions  
Entertainment Group 
(Production division) 
Distribution Division 
BBC Worldwide 
(BBC Worldwide Content & 
Production) 
BBC Worldwide Sales & 
Distribution 
21st Century Fox and Core Media 
(Endemol Shine Group) 
Endemol Worldwide 
Distribution/Shine 
International 
ITV 
(ITV Studios) 
ITV Studios Global 
Entertainment 
Modern Times Group 
(Nice Entertainment Group) 
DRG 
ProSieben.Sat1 
(Red Arrow Entertainment) 
Red Arrow International 
RTL 
(Fremantle Media) 
FremantleMedia International 
Source: author’s compilation 
 
There are five main reasons for a business to seek control of another: to strengthen its 
position in a territory, increase its share in a particular market segment, acquire new 
expertise, create scale and/or integrate vertically. Consolidation in the TV industry is often 
driven by the need to create scale, which brings benefits ranging from synergies to a larger 
international footprint and better financial capacity (Chalaby, 2012b; Doyle, 2002: 34-7; 
Owers et al., 2004: 34-43). 
Entertainment conglomerates and international broadcasters that acquire firms located 
downstream in the chain seek to integrate vertically, which often enable them to fulfill 
 30 
several strategic objectives. For instance, when Time Warner acquired Eyeworks, it 
strengthened its position in TV content production, expanded its footprint outside its 
domestic market and developed its expertise and market presence in non-scripted genres.  
Vertical integration does not have a direct impact on the chain’s input-output structure 
because integrated companies behave within their segments like independent businesses. 
Distribution remains a distinct process in the chain and integrated distributors acquire and 
sell third party programming just like other firms. In order for these divisions to retain 
credibility in the marketplace (without which independent production companies would not 
give them content to represent) they need to treat all parties with a degree of fairness and 
integrity. The same goes for production: none of the newly integrated production firms 
works as ‘captive’ organization to their owners: they all operate on the open content 
market and can supply content to any channel or platform. Should their programmes not 
find the best home these would under-perform, resulting in a negative commercial impact 
for all parties involved. In addition, the success of these divisions depends on their ability 
to retain top creative talent, who would find it unpalatable to supply one sole broadcaster. 
For instance, it might be ITV’s strategic objective to air more of its own content, but in 
actual terms only a small proportion of ITV Studios’ output is suitable for ITV channels.  
 
Internet Disruption 
Vertical integration in particular is driven by an exogenous factor:  disruption from the 
Internet. Gereffi argues that the network has the capacity to ‘deconstruct’ chains because of 
‘(a) its ability to create markets on a scale and with a level of efficiency not previously 
possible and (b) a radical “pull” business strategy that substitutes information for inventory 
and ships products only when there is real demand from end customers’ (Gereffi, 2001: 
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1628).  
The impact of the Internet is particularly acute on the TV content chain’s governance 
structure as it poses a threat to the dominance of its lead firms, the broadcasters.  As seen, a 
growing number of platforms use Internet infrastructure to aggregate and distribute content 
in a very cost-efficient manner. Their presence makes content aggregation a more 
competitive business for traditional content aggregators, which have to compete harder for 
viewers and IP rights. These platforms not only make the aggregation segment more 
competitive but also strengthen the position of producers that now have a new breed of 
buyer acquiring their content: the collective programming budget of SVoD services is 
expected to rise to US$ 6.8 billion in 2015 (Berman, 2015).  
The notion that ‘content is king’ has never been entirely true since communications 
infrastructure, marketing and connectivity all play a crucial role (e.g. Odlyzko, 2001). As 
noted above, a content aggregator that has built an entertainment destination is in a 
commanding position. It remains that many media firms are moving upstream in order to 
defend their position and be present in an industry segment that has become very attractive. 
 
Conclusion 
The last decades have been transformative for television as technology and globalization 
have combined to bring rapid change. The new millennium marks the moment when the 
TV content chain internationalized – as signalled by a sudden and synchronous 
development of transnational TV channels - and the TV industry began to be coordinated 
on a global scale. The implications are threefold: 
Many scholars argue that the extent of media globalization is exaggerated (e.g. Flew 
2007; Mattelart, 2002; Sparks, 2007). Indeed, not all content is ubiquitous and few firms 
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have a footprint that is truly global. Fears concerning the annihilation of local cultures have 
been unfounded notably because entertainment conglomerates have proven adept at 
adapting to audiences (Waisbord, 2004). But the point is that globalization is at once a 
structural reality - television is globalizing because value-adding sequences have become 
international - and a structuring reality – firms’ decisions and strategies are coordinated by 
a value chain that is global in scope.  
International fragmentation is prevalent in the TV industry, yet at another level it is 
being re-integrated through international trade. The advent of TV formats has deepened 
global media flows because the intellectual property (IP) and know-how that lies within 
TV shows is travelling alongside ready-made tapes. Even though many broadcasters 
predominantly operate at national level they have become bound to the global content 
market as they outsource a growing proportion of their content to international suppliers. 
Globalization has also changed the nature of production processes in the TV industry: the 
local version of a format like Come Dine With Me involves technical equipment from 
Japan or Germany, editing software from Australia or the USA, and expertise and IP from 
the UK. The show may not be produced by the commissioning broadcaster but a company 
that can be a joint venture between a local producer and the format rights holders. The 
outcome is an industry that mirrors other industrial sectors: global coordination, 
transnational production processes, and integration through trade (Kenney, 2004).  
In a globalizing world, industrial policy plays a key role in helping domestic firms to 
compete in value chains (Gereffi and Sturgeon, 2013). In too many countries media 
regulation is conservative in character and protects lead firms’ interests. In Europe, the IP 
rights framework remains biased in favour of broadcasters, preventing the emergence of a 
strong production sector. However, vertically integrated national broadcasters, public or 
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commercial, are ‘zombie’ organizations whose business model is out-of-date that are kept 
alive by regulatory protection. Most of these are ill-adapted to perform in a globalized 
market and do not constitute the most efficient way of promoting local culture and 
industry. For businesses to thrive in a global economy, regulators need to take into account 
value chains when formulating sectoral policy and adopt measures to facilitate industrial 
upgrading, as a growing number of emerging economies do (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 
2011; Gereffi and Sturgeon, 2013). Broadcasting regulators across Europe could do more 
to support segments along the supply chain and protect them from lead firms. This would 
enable these businesses to grow and reach the required size in order to get involved in the 
TV content global value chain.  
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